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Abstract
In non-truthful auctions, agents’ utility for a strategy depends on the strategies of the oppo-
nents and also the prior distribution over their private types; the set of Bayes Nash equilibria
generally has an intricate dependence on the prior. Using the First Price Auction as our main
demonstrating example, we show that O˜(n/ǫ2) samples from the prior with n agents suffice for
an algorithm to learn the interim utilities for all monotone bidding strategies. As a consequence,
this number of samples suffice for learning all approximate equilibria. We give almost matching
(up to polylog factors) lower bound on the sample complexity for learning utilities. We also
consider settings where agents must pay a search cost to discover their own types. Drawing on
a connection between this setting and the first price auction, discovered recently by Kleinberg
et al. (2016), we show that O˜(n/ǫ2) samples suffice for utilities and equilibria to be estimated
in a near welfare-optimal descending auction in this setting. En route, we improve the sample
complexity bound, recently obtained by Guo et al. (2019), for the Pandora’s Box problem, which
is a classical model for sequential consumer search.
1 Introduction
Mechanism design devises systems in which multiple agents take strategic actions based on their
private preferences (designated as types). For example, an auctioneer devises rules that determine
an auction’s winner and payments, based on bidders’ actions (the bids); the bidders then, knowing
the rule and their types — in this case their own values for the item at sale — strategize over their
bids. The following task is central to many aspects of mechanism design: given agents’ strategies,
evaluate each agent’s performance, or utility. To start with, agents are most often interested in
predicting the performance of their strategies given what the other agents do; nowadays, auction-
eers and third-party service providers often give guidance to bidding, and are interested in such
evaluations as well. An auctioneer often would like to find out if a profile of strategies best respond
to each other and are hence at equilibrium; revenue, welfare and surplus analysis at equilibrium is
all based on utility estimation. As another application of utility estimation, one may be interested
in knowing how far a mechanism is from being incentive compatible, i.e., supposing all other agents
bid their true values, how much incentive an agent would have to lie about her value (see, e.g.,
Balcan et al., 2019).
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Since a bidder’s individual type is known only to herself but may greatly affect her actions
and the payoff of everyone else — a scenario known as an incomplete information game — more
is needed for utility prediction. The canonical paradigm assumes that each agent’s type is drawn
from a distribution (Harsanyi, 1967). The utility prediction problem becomes, supposing agents
other than i use given strategies and their types are drawn from the distributions, what is agent i’s
utility in expectation for using a certain strategy? This so-called interim utility is at heart of much
modern mechanism design literature from both economics and computer science (e.g. Myerson,
1981; Laffont et al., 1995; Syrgkanis and Tardos, 2013; Hartline and Lucier, 2015).
As is natural for many other settings with distributional prior knowledge, it is important to
know how sensitive the problem is to the accuracy of the prior distributions; in particular, given
sample access to the distribution, how many samples are needed to estimate the interim utilities of
agents, for any profile of strategies? This is the question we study in this work.
As we discuss below, without appealing to the structure of a game, it is hopeless to learn all
utilities with a finite number of samples. In this work we take the First Price Auction (FPA)
and the All Pay auction as two examples of non-truthful auction, and show that a small number
of samples from the type distributions suffice to learn interim utilities for all monotone bidding
strategies.
The first price auction is one of the most ubiquitous and fundamental auctions, with a large
literature on its various aspects, and is gaining more popularity recently for various practical reasons
(see e.g. Sluis, 2019; Rajan, 2019; Akbarpour and Li, 2018). In the FPA, the item is sold to the
bidder with the highest bid, who then pays her own bid; all other bidders pay nothing. Our main
result is that, for an FPA with n bidders, O˜(n/ǫ2) samples from the type distribution suffice to
learn, with high probability, the interim utilities up to ǫ additive error for any profile of monotone
bidding strategies.1 As a corollary, this number of samples also suffice to learn the set of all ǫ-Bayes
Nash equilibria of an FPA. We also show that our bound is tight up to a logarithmic factor.
Sampling from Type Distributions. The assumption of having sample access to the under-
lying type distribution is standard in a long line of work on learning in mechanism design (e.g.
Cole and Roughgarden, 2014; Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2015, 2016; Balcan et al., 2016, 2018;
Gonczarowski and Nisan, 2017; Syrgkanis, 2017; Gonczarowski and Weinberg, 2018; Guo et al., 2019b).
In particular, type samples have been assumed in the context of learning in non-truthful auctions
(Balcan et al., 2019). Just as in classical microeconomics, prior knowledge (in the form of sam-
ples here) comes from market research, survey, simulation etc., and is not assumed to be from
past bidding history. We distance our approach from the line of work on learning non-truthful
auctions where samples are from past bidding history (Chawla et al., 2017; Hartline and Taggart,
2019). This latter approach, with obvious merits, has its limitations. Crucially, it assumes that
the observed bidding in a non-truthful mechanism is at equilibrium, which may not be the case in
reality; also, to avoid strategic issues between auctions, the bidders need to be short lived or myopic
strategically. The two approaches (type samples vs. bid samples) complement each other even in
learning non-truthful mechanisms; this work takes the first approach, and leaves the direction with
bid samples as an enticing open question.
Our Techniques. Let us draw an analogy with classical PAC learning, where one typically has a
class of functions on an input space and an unknown distribution over the input; with samples from
the input distribution, one is to learn the expectation of the functions on the unknown distribution.
In our setting, every profile of strategies, one for each agent, defines a function which maps a profile
1The O˜(·) notation omits polylogarithmic factors.
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of types to a utility for each agent; given the underlying value distribution, the expectation of this
function is the agents’ interim utilities. We would like to have a number of samples such that, with
high probability, the empirical estimation of utilities for all bidding strategies is approximately
correct.
With any finite number of samples, it is impossible to learn utilities for all arbitrary bidding
strategies. Consider the following example: in an auction with two bidders, the first bidder having
value 1 and bidding 12 , and the second bidder’s value v2 uniformly drawn from [0, 1]; any finite set
of samples of v2 has probability measure 0 in the distribution of v2; therefore on any set of samples,
there are bidding strategies of bidder 2 that look the same on the sampled values but give bidder 1
drastically different utilities in expectation on the value distribution.
To overcome this, we observe that non-monotone bidding strategies are (weakly) dominated
by monotone ones in a first price auction — a bidding strategy is monotone if its bid is non-
decreasing with the value. For all practical purposes, therefore, learning utilities for monotone
bidding strategies suffices. A key technical insight of this work is that the restriction to monotone
strategies makes it possible to learn utilities with a small number of samples.
Our sample complexity bound comes from bounding the pseudo-dimension of the class of util-
ity functions for monotone bidding strategies. Pseudo-dimension is a generalization of the VC-
dimension, and has been applied to learning in mechanism design (Morgenstern and Roughgarden,
2015, 2016; Balcan et al., 2018, 2019). Another key step is a lemma (Lemma 3.10), highly related to
a concentration inequality shown by Devanur et al. (2016), that translates learning on a correlated
distribution from samples to learning on a natural empirical product distribution.
We extend our main result to the all pay auction. In the all pay auction, the item is sold to the
highest bidder, but all bidders, including the losers, pay their bids. This auction is a good model
for crowdsourcing (Chawla et al., 2012).
Lower Bound. We give a nontrivial, information-theoretic lower bound for the utility learning
problem, showing that Ω(n/ǫ2) samples are needed for learning utilities with monotone bidding
strategies. The polynomial dependence on n, the number of bidders, is interesting. In particular,
this highlights the difference between learning utilities for a fixed profile of bidding strategies and
our task, which is to simultaneously learn the utilities for all strategies. For the first task, one
may simply estimate, for each bidder, the cumulative density function of the highest bid among
the opponents; it takes only Θ(1/ǫ2) samples for the estimated CDF to be accurate everywhere.
Auctions with Search Costs. We extend our sample complexity bound to auctions with search
costs. In this setting, bidders know their value distributions but need to incur a cost to learn their
own values. Real estate and insurance markets exhibit this feature. Kleinberg et al. (2016) showed
that the Dutch auction beats the English auction and is near optimal at equilibrium for welfare in
this setting. If the value distributions are unknown, how many samples are needed for equilibria of a
Dutch auction with search costs to be learned? A real estate market maker may be interested in this:
he may collect market information and suggest search and bidding strategies for the participants.
We show that O˜(n/ǫ2) samples again suffice. Specifically, with high probability we can reduce a
Dutch auction with search costs on the true distribution to a first price auction without search
costs on a transformed empirical distribution consisting of O˜(n/ǫ2) value samples; any equilibrium
in the first price auction can be transformed to an approximate equilibrium in the Dutch auction
whose welfare is no less than (1−1/e)-fraction of the maximal achievable welfare, up to an additive
error of ǫ.
The maximal achievable welfare is obtained by Weitzman’s algorithm for the Pandora’s Box
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problem (Weitzman, 1979), a classical model for sequential costly search. En route, we improve a
sample complexity bound for Pandora’s Box problem recently obtained by Guo et al. (2019a).
Additional Related Works. All the works cited above on learning in mechanisms are on learn-
ing revenue optimal mechanisms. The following two exceptions are particularly close to our work.
Given a non-truthful auction and a finite set S of types, Balcan et al. (2019) studied the number of
value samples needed to learn the utility a type within S could gain by misreporting another type
in S instead of being truthful, if all other bidders are truthful. In comparison, we learn utilities
when all bidders use arbitrary monotone bidding strategies; this suffices for the study of virtually all
properties of an auction, including the task of Balcan et al. (2019). We also remove the assumption
of finitude of the type space. Our results rely on the monotonicity of the bidding strategy, which
is natural in single item auctions; whether extension is possible to multi-parameter settings in a
similar manner is an interesting question.
Areyan Viqueira et al. (2019) studied learning utilities in simulation-based games. They consid-
ered abstract conditional normal-form games, where the conditions play the role of types in auctions.
They used Rademacher complexity, similar to pseudo-dimension, to bound the number of sample
conditions, but did not give such bounds for concrete games. Bounding these complexity measures
is generally challenging if not impossible. For example, without monotonicity in bidding strategies,
the pseudo-dimension of utilities even in first price auctions is unbounded, as we discussed above.
There is a large literature on the computation of equilibrium in the first price auction (e.g.
Marshall et al., 1994; Gayle and Richard, 2008; Escamocher et al., 2009). There has been major
recent progress on the problem for discrete distributions (Shen et al., 2020). Our work provides
additional motivation to study the problem on discrete distributions.
Guo et al. (2019a) gave a general method to bound sample complexity for learning over product
distributions. Their main result requires a “strong monotonicity” property on the problem, which
is satisfied by the Pandora’s Box problem. Utilities for monotone bidding strategies, however, do
not satisfy their property; our bound for the Pandora’s Box problem also slightly improves over
theirs.
2 Preliminaries on Auctions
Auctions. In a single item auction, n bidders compete for the item. Define [n] := {1, . . . , n}.
Each bidder i ∈ [n] has a private value vi drawn from a distribution Fi supported on Ti ⊆ R+.
Distributions of different bidders are independent and can be non-identical. In the auction, each
bidder i makes a sealed-envelope bid of bi ≥ 0, and the auction maps the vector of bids b to an
allocation and payments. xi(b) ∈ [0, 1] denotes the probability with which bidder i receives the
item at bid vector b, with
∑n
i=1 xi(b) ≤ 1, and pi(b) is the (expected) payment made by bidder i.
In the first price auction (FPA), the highest bidder (assuming there is no tie) wins the item and
pays her bid, and no other bidder pays anything. In the all pay auction, the highest bidder wins
the item but every bidder pays her bid.
Bidder i’s ex post utility is Ui(vi, bi, b−i) := vixi(b)− pi(b).
As is standard in auction theory, we use v−i to denote the vector (v1, . . . , vi−1, vi+1, . . . , vn).
Other vectors with subscript “−i” are similarly defined.
Strategies and Equilibrium. A bidding strategy maps a bidder’s value to a bid. With slight
abuse of notation, we denote bidder i’s strategy as bi : Ti → R+. To distinguish a bidding strategy
(a mapping) and a bid (a number), we write the former as bi(·) and the latter as bi. We write a
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vector of bids (b1(v1), · · · , bn(vn)) as b(v), and denote by b−i(v−i) the bids made by bidders except
bidder i.
Bidder i with value vi and bidding bi, while the other bidders use bidding strategies b−i(·), has
interim utility
ui(vi, bi, b−i(·)) := Ev−i∼F−i [Ui(vi, bi, b−i(v−i))] (1)
= Ev−i∼F−i [vixi(bi, b−i(v−i))− pi(bi, b−i(v−i))] .
Definition 2.1. For ǫ ≥ 0, a profile of bidding strategies b(·) = (b1(·), · · · , bn(·)) in an auction is
an ǫ-Bayes Nash equilibrium (ǫ-BNE) for value distribution F =
∏n
i=1 Fi if for each bidder i ∈ [n]
and each vi ∈ Ti, for any b
′
i ∈ R+,
ui(vi, bi(vi), b−i(·)) ≥ ui(vi, b
′
i, b−i(·))− ǫ.
If ǫ = 0, b(·) is a Bayes Nash equilibrium.
A bidding strategy bi(·) is said to be monotone if v ≥ v
′ ⇒ bi(v) ≥ bi(v
′).
Proposition 2.2. In a first price auction or an all pay auction, for any bidding strategy bi(·) of
bidder i, for any value distributions F−i, and any bidding strategies b−i(·), there is a monotone
bidding strategy b′i(·) such that ∀vi ∈ Ti, ui(vi, b
′
i(vi), b−i(·)) ≥ ui(vi, bi(vi), b−i(·)).
The proof of Proposition 2.2 is in Appendix A.1.
Throughout the paper we assume that there is an upper bound H on Ti. Therefore, no bidder
is willing to bid bi > H and we only consider bidding strategies bi(·) that map Ti to [0,H].
3 Sample Complexity of Utility Estimation
We are given a set of m samples, s = (s1, . . . , sm) from the value distribution F =
∏
i Fi. Note
that each sample sj is a vector of values (sj1, . . . , s
j
n) drawn from F .
Given value samples s, a utility learning algorithm A, for each bidder i with value vi and bidding
strategies b(·) = (b1(·), · · · , bn(·)), outputs A(s, i, vi, b(·)), which estimates bidder i’s interim utility
when her value is vi and the bidders use bidding strategies b(·).
Definition 3.1. Let B be a set of bidding strategy profiles. For ǫ > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1), a utility learning
algorithm (ǫ, δ)-learns with m samples the utilities over B if, for any product value distribution F ,
with probability at least 1− δ, for any bidding strategy profile b(·) ∈ B, for each bidder i ∈ [n] and
any vi ∈ Ti,
|A(s, i, vi, b(·)) − ui(vi, bi(vi), b−i(·))| < ǫ,
where the randomness is over the random draw of samples and the randomness of A if it is ran-
domized.
Throughout the paper we will restrict B to be the set of profiles of monotone bidding strategies
(see Proposition 2.2).
3.1 Upper Bound on Sample Complexity
In this section, we show that O˜(n/ǫ2) value samples suffice for learning the interim utilities for all
monotone bidding strategies. The learning algorithm is the empirical distribution estimator, which
outputs expected utilities on the uniform distribution over the samples.
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Definition 3.2. The empirical distribution estimator, denoted by Emp, estimates interim utilities
on the uniform distribution over the samples. Formally, on samples s = (s1, . . . , sm), for bidder i
with value vi, for bidding strategies b(·),
Emp(s, i, vi, b(·)) :=
1
m
m∑
j=1
Ui(vi, bi(vi), b−i(s
j
−i)).
One more technicality concerns what happens when more than one bidder makes the highest
bid. Even though in any equilibrium of a first price auction, this must happen with probability 0,
for the utility learning problem to be well defined we need to specify tie-breaking rules. As we shall
see, the tie-breaking rule does not affect the sample complexity. We consider here two tie-breaking
rules: by random-allocation rule, the item is assigned to one of the highest bidders uniformly at
random; by no-allocation rule, no one wins the item whenever there is a tie for the highest bid.
Theorem 3.3. Suppose Ti ⊆ [0,H] for each i ∈ [n], and the tie-breaking rule is random-allocation
or no-allocation. For any ǫ > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1), there is
M = O
(
H2
ǫ2
[
n log n log
(
H
ǫ
)
+ log
(n
δ
)])
, (2)
such that for any m ≥ M , the empirical distribution estimator Emp (ǫ, δ)-learns with m samples
the utilities over the set of all monotone bidding strategies.
3.1.1 Pseudo-dimension and the Proof of Theorem 3.3
Pseudo-dimension is a well known tool for upper bounding sample complexity (see, e.g. Anthony and Bartlett,
2009), and has been applied to learning in mechanism design (Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2015,
2016; Balcan et al., 2018, 2019).
Definition 3.4. Given a class H of real-valued functions on input space X , a set of input x1, . . . , xm
is said to be pseudo-shattered if there exist witnesses t1, . . . , tm ∈ R such that for any label vector
l ∈ {1,−1}m, there exists hl ∈ H such that sgn(hl(xi) − ti) = li for each i = 1, . . . ,m, where
sgn(y) = 1 if y > 0 and −1 if y < 0. The pseudo-dimension of H, Pdim(H), is the size of the
largest set of inputs that can be pseudo-shattered by H.
Definition 3.5. For ǫ > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1), a class of functions H : X → R is (ǫ, δ)-uniformly convergent
with sample complexity M if for any m ≥M , for any distribution F on X , if s1, . . . , sm are i.i.d.
samples from F , with probability at least 1− δ, for every h ∈ H,
∣∣∣Ex∼F [h(x)] − 1m∑mj=1 h(sj)∣∣∣ < ǫ.
Theorem 3.6 (See Anthony and Bartlett, 2009). Let H be a class of functions with range [0,H]
and pseudo-dimension d = Pdim(H), for any ǫ > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1), H is (ǫ, δ)-uniformly convergent
with sample complexity O
(
(Hǫ )
2[d log(Hǫ ) + log(
1
δ )]
)
.
We show Theorem 3.3 by treating the utilities on monotone bidding strategies as a class of
functions, whose uniform convergence implies that Emp learns the interim utilities.
For each bidder i, let hvi,b(·) be the function that maps the opponents’ values to bidder i’s ex
post utility, that is,
hvi,b(·)(v−i) = Ui(vi, bi(vi), b−i(v−i)).
Let Hi be the set of all such functions corresponding to the set of monotone strategies,
Hi =
{
hvi,b(·)(·) | vi ∈ Ti, b(·) is monotone
}
.
6
By (1), the expectation of hvi,b(·)(·) over F−i is the interim utility of bidder i:
Ev−i∼F−i
[
hvi,b(·)(v−i)
]
= ui(vi, bi(vi), b−i(·)).
By Definition 3.2, on samples s = (s1, . . . , sm),
Emp(s, i, vi, b(·)) =
1
m
m∑
j=1
hvi,b(·)(sj−i).
Thus,
|Emp(s, i, vi, b(·)) − ui(vi, bi(vi), b−i(·))| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ev−i
[
hvi,b(·)(v−i)
]
−
1
m
m∑
j=1
hvi,b(·)(sj−i)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (3)
The right hand side of (3) is the difference between the expectation of hvi,b(·) on the distribution
F−i and that on the empirical distribution with samples drawn from F−i. Now by Theorem 3.6, to
bound the number of samples needed by Emp to (ǫ, δ)-learn the utilities over monotone strategies, it
suffices to bound the pseudo-dimension ofHi. With the following key lemma, the proof is completed
by observing that the range of each hvi,b(·) is within [−H,H] and by taking a union bound over
i ∈ [n].
Lemma 3.7. If tie breaking is random-allocation or no-allocation, then Pdim(Hi) = O(n log n).
The proof of Lemma 3.7 makes crucial use of the monotonicity of bidding strategies, and follows a
powerful framework for bounding pseudo-dimensions introduced by Morgenstern and Roughgarden
(2016) and Balcan et al. (2018). But existing techniques do not immediately apply here, due to the
fact that bidding strategies, even when monotone, are infinite dimensional objects. Therefore we
cannot easily make arguments on the geometry of the parameter space (cf. the proof of Lemma 4.4
which uses a more direct geometric argument a` la Balcan et al., 2018). We give a proof here for
the simplest case with two bidders and no-allocation tie-breaking rule, and relegate the full proof
to Appendix B.1.1.
Proof of Lemma 3.7 for a special case. Consider n = 2 and no-allocation tie-breaking rule. Fix an
arbitrary set of m samples s1−i, . . . , s
m
−i. Consider any set of potential witnesses (t1, t2, . . . , tm).
Each hypothesis in Hi then gives every sample s
j
−i a label according to the witness tj , giving rise
to a label vector in {−1,+1}m. We show that Hi can be divided into m+1 sub-classes H
0
i , . . . ,H
m
i ,
such that each sub-class Hki generates at most m + 1 different label vectors. Thus Hi generates
at most (m+ 1)2 label vectors in total. To pseudo-shatter s1−i, . . . , s
m
−i, we need 2
m different label
vectors; therefore (m+ 1)2 ≥ 2m, which implies m = O(1).
We now show how Hi is thus divided. Note that, for n = 2, each s
k
−i is just a real number and
we can sort them; for ease of notation let xk denote sk−i for k = 1, . . . ,m and suppose x
1 ≤ x2 ≤
· · · ≤ xm. We put hypothesis hvi,b(·) into the k-th sub-class, Hki , if
b−i(x
k) < bi(vi) and b−i(x
k+1) ≥ bi(vi).
This is well defined because, by assumption, b−i(x) is monotone non-decreasing in x.
We now show that each sub-class Hki gives rise to at most m + 1 label vectors. For any
hvi,b(·) ∈ Hki , we have h
vi,b(·)(xj) = vi − bi(vi) for any j ≤ k (because bidder i’s bid bi(vi) is higher
than the opponent’s), and hvi,b(·)(xj) = 0 for any j > k. On the first k samples x1, . . . , xk, any fixed
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hypothesis hvi,b(·)(·) ∈ Hki outputs a constant vi − bi(vi); as one varies this constant and compares
it with the k witnesses t1, . . . , tk, there are only k + 1 possible results from the comparisons. On
the remaining m− k samples, only one pattern is possible, since all hypotheses in Hki output 0 on
these samples. Therefore, at most k + 1 ≤ m+ 1 label vectors can be generated by Hki .
3.1.2 Learning on Empirical Product Distributions and Equilibrium Preservation
The empirical distribution estimator approximates interim utilities with high probability, but this
does not immediately imply that one may take the first price auction on the empirical distribution
as a close approximation to the auction on the original distribution. This is because the empirical
distribution over samples is correlated — the values sj1, . . . , s
j
n are drawn as a vector, instead of
independently. Standard notions, such as Bayes Nash equilibria, defined on product distributions
become intricate on correlated distributions, and there is no reason to expect the latter to cor-
respond to the equilibria in the original auction. Therefore, it is desirable that utilities can also
be learned on a product distribution arising from the samples, where each bidder’s value is inde-
pendently drawn, uniformly from the m samples of her value. We show that this can indeed be
done, without substantial increase in the number of samples. The key technical step, Lemma 3.10,
is closely related to a concentration inequality by Devanur et al. (2016). We believe our lemma
comes more handy for applications such as ours. The reduction from learning on such an empirical
product distribution to learning on the empirical distribution may be of independent interest. In
fact, in Section 4 we invoke Lemma 3.10 in a different context, that of learning in Pandora’s Box
problem; the reduction is crucial there for obtaining a polynomial-time learning algorithm.
Definition 3.8. Given samples s = (s1, . . . , sm), Ei is defined to be the uniform distribution over
{s1i , . . . , s
m
i }. The empirical product distribution E is the product distribution E :=
∏n
i=1Ei.
Definition 3.9. For ǫ > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1), a class of functions H :
∏n
i=1 Ti → R is (ǫ, δ)-uniformly
convergent on product distribution with sample complexity M if for any m ≥M , for any product
distribution F on
∏n
i=1 Ti, if s
1, . . . , sm are i.i.d. samples from F , with probability at least 1 − δ,
for every h ∈ H,
|Et∼F [h(t)]−Et∼E [h(t)]| < ǫ,
where E is the empirical product distribution.
Lemma 3.10. Let H be a class of functions from a product space T to [0,H]. If H is (ǫ, δ)-
uniformly convergent with sample complexity m = m(ǫ, δ), then H is
(
2ǫ, Hδǫ
)
-uniformly convergent
on product distribution with sample complexity m.
Combining Theorem 3.3 with Lemma 3.10, we derive our learning results on the empirical
product distribution.
Definition 3.11. The empirical product distribution estimator Empp estimates interim utilities
of a bidding strategy on the empirical product distribution E. Formally, for bidder i with value vi,
for bidding strategy profile b(·),
Empp(s, i, vi, b(·)) := Ev−i∼E−i [Ui(vi, bi(vi), b−i(v−i))] . (4)
Theorem 3.12. Suppose Ti ⊆ [0,H] for each i ∈ [n], and the tie-breaking rule is random-allocation
or no-allocation. For any ǫ > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1), there is
M = O
(
H2
ǫ2
[
n log n log
(
H
ǫ
)
+ log
(n
δ
)])
, (5)
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such that for any m ≥M , the empirical distribution estimator Empp (ǫ, δ)-learns with m samples
the utilities over the set of all monotone bidding strategies.
By Theorem 3.12, utilities in the FPA on the empirical product distribution approximate those
in the FPA on the original distribution, therefore the two auctions share the same set of approximate
equilibria:
Corollary 3.13. Suppose Ti ⊆ [0,H] for each i ∈ [n] and the tie-breaking rule is random-allocation
or no-allocation. For any ǫ, ǫ′ > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1), for m satisfying (5), with probability at least 1 − δ
over random draws of s, for any monotone bidding strategy profile b(·), if b(·) is an ǫ′-BNE in
the first price auction on value distribution E =
∏
iEi, then b(·) is an (ǫ
′ + 2ǫ)-BNE in the first
price auction on value distribution F =
∏
i Fi. Conversely, if b(·) is an ǫ
′-BNE in the first price
auction on value distribution F , then b(·) is an (ǫ′ + 2ǫ)-BNE in the first price auction on value
distribution E.
Corollary 3.13 has an interesting consequence. Shen et al. (2020) gave a polynomial-time algo-
rithm for computing Bayes Nash equilibrium in first price auctions on discrete value distributions.
The empirical product distribution is discrete, so one can run Shen et al.’s algorithm on it. Corol-
lary 3.13 immediately implies:
Corollary 3.14. There is a Monte Carlo randomized algorithm for computing an ǫ-BNE in a first
price auction with n bidders on arbitrary product value distributions. The running time of the
algorithm is polynomial in n and 1ǫ .
Note that the running time of the algorithm does not depend on the size of the distributions’
support, and works for continuous distributions as well.
Results very similar to Theorem 3.3, Theorem 3.12, and Corollary 3.13, apply to the all pay
auction, with the same bounds on the number of samples. The proofs are almost identical and so
are omitted.
3.2 Lower Bound of Sample Complexity
We give an information theoretic lower bound on the number of samples needed for any algorithm
to learn monotone utilities in a first price auction. The lower bound matches our upper bound up
to polylog factors.
Theorem 3.15. For any ǫ < 14000 , δ <
1
20 , there is a family of product distributions for which no
algorithm (ǫ, δ)-learns, with m samples, utilities over the set of all monotone bidding strategies, for
any m ≤ 1
4×108
· n
ǫ2
.
The proof of Theorem 3.15 is in Appendix B.2. As a sketch, the product distributions we
construct encode length n − 1 binary strings by having slightly unfair Bernoulli distribution for
each bidder, the bias shrinking as n grows large. We then show that, if with few samples a learning
algorithm learns utilities for all monotone bidding strategies, then there must exist two product
distributions from the family which differ at only one coordinate, and yet they can be told apart
by the learning algorithm. This must violate well-known information theoretic lower bounds (e.g.
Mansour, 2011).
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4 Auctions with Costly Search
We extend our sample complexity results to auctions in which bidders need to incur a cost to know
precisely their values, a model proposed and studied by Kleinberg et al. (2016).
In this model, each bidder i knows the distribution Fi from which her value is drawn, but gets to
know her value vi only after incurring a cost ci. This models well, for example, a real estate market,
where ci is an inspection cost. Kleinberg et al. (2016) showed that, due to the search costs, the
English auction can have low efficiency, whereas the Dutch auction, with its descending price, can
coordinate the bidders’ searching in an almost efficient way. Intuitively, a bidder does not inspect
her value until the price drops to a certain level, and then, after inspection at this threshold, either
claims the item at the threshold price, or waits till later. In fact, absent incentive issues, this is the
procedure a central authority would follow to maximize the welfare; the elegant algorithm is known
as the Pandora’s Box algorithm (Weitzman, 1979). With incentives, bidders shade their bids just
as in a first price auction, and there is efficiency loss. This was made precise by Kleinberg et al.,
who showed a correspondence between the equilibria in a Dutch auction with search costs and the
equilibria in a first price auction without search costs but with transformed value distributions.
The near efficiency of the Dutch auction therefore follows from Price of Anarchy results on the first
price auction (Syrgkanis and Tardos, 2013; Hoy et al., 2018).
In this section, we first review in Section 4.1 Pandora’s Box algorithm, necessary for under-
standing the correspondence observed by Kleinberg et al. (2016). En route, we show that O˜(n/ǫ2)
samples from the value distributions suffice for the algorithm to be ǫ-close to optimal when the
distributions are unknown. Our bound slightly improves a recent result by Guo et al. (2019a).
We then review, in Section 4.2, the correspondence between the Dutch auction with search
costs and the FPA without search costs. The correspondence between auctions involves a mapping
between the strategies in the two auctions and a transformation of the value distributions. The
mapping and transformation depend on the value distributions and the search costs. We show that,
when the value distributions are unknown, with O˜(1/ǫ2) value samples, an “empirical correspon-
dence” can be established such that all monotone bidding strategies in the Dutch auction have
approximately the same utilities as their image bidding strategies in the FPA. Combining with our
learning results on the FPA, we show that, with O˜(n/ǫ2) samples, any equilibrium of the FPA
without search costs on a transformed empirical distribution can be mapped to an approximate
equilibrium of the Dutch auction on the true distribution. Moreover, due to the bounded Price of
Anarchy of the FPA (e.g. Syrgkanis and Tardos, 2013), the Dutch auction with this approximate
equilibrium is approximately optimal in terms of welfare.
4.1 Pandoras Box Problem and Its Sample Complexity
Absent search costs, the welfare (a.k.a. the efficiency) of a single item auction is the value of
the bidder who is allocated the item. The maximum expected welfare is therefore simply the
expectation of the largest value among the bidders. Auctions that sell to the highest bidder and
charges the winner a price equal to the second highest bid gives bidders correct incentives to bid
their true values and maximizes the welfare. The sealed-bid second price auction and the ascending
price auction (the English auction) both achieve this, whereas the first price auction and the
equivalent descending price auction (the Dutch auction) obtain only approximately optimal welfare
at equilibrium (Syrgkanis and Tardos, 2013; Hoy et al., 2018). With search costs, the welfare of an
auction is the value of the bidder winning the item minus all the search costs paid. Even without
incentive considerations, the problem is nontrivial algorithmically.
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The Pandora’s Box Problem. The following Pandora’s Box problem, named by Weitzman
(1979), abstracts the welfare maximization problem in the presence of search costs. We are given n
boxes, each box i containing a value vi drawn independently from a known distribution Fi; to open
box i and see vi, we must pay a cost of ci; at any point, we can take any box that has been opened
and quit, or open a closed box at a cost, or quit without taking anything. Our payoff is the value
in the box taken (if any) minus the costs we paid along the way. Given F1, . . . , Fn and c1, . . . , cn,
our goal is to compute a procedure that maximizes the expected payoff.
Weitzman (1979) used this setting to model a consumer searching for an item to purchase; he
gave an optimal algorithm, which is in turn a special case of Gittins Index algorithm from Bayesian
bandits (Gittins, 1979).
We describe his algorithm below. To facilitate discussion of learning, we treat search costs as
given, and algorithms as mappings from (unseen) values v1, . . . , vn to a payoff. Certainly, only
mappings that correspond to valid search procedures are meaningful; in particular, the procedure’s
decision (e.g., to open which box) cannot depend on values that have not been revealed. It is the
associated search procedure that we are interested in.
Definition 4.1 (Index Based Algorithms/Mappings). Given search costs (c1, . . . , cn), a mapping A
from (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ [0,H]
n to R is index based if there exist indices r1, . . . , rn ∈ R such that on
any vector of values (v1, . . . , vn), the output of A is given by the following procedure:
• Open boxes in descending order of ri. Without loss of generality assume r1 ≥ · · · ≥ rn.
• If r1 < 0, do not open any box and output 0.
• Otherwise, after opening box i, if max{v1, . . . , vi} ≥ ri+1 or i = n, stop immediately and
output max{v1, . . . , vi} − (c1 + · · ·+ ci).
Theorem 4.2 (Weitzman, 1979). The optimal algorithm corresponds to an index-based mapping;
the index ri for box i is the unique solution to Ev∼Fi [max(v − ri, 0)] = ci.
Learning. We now answer the following learning question: if the distributions F1, · · · , Fn are
unknown, how many samples from them suffice for us to devise an algorithm that is close to
optimal on the original distribution? Recently, Guo et al. (2019a) gave a polynomial bound for the
problem; we give an alternative analysis using pseudo-dimension, which leads to a slightly improved
bound. We make use of a technical lemmas of theirs (Lemma 4.5). For our learning algorithm to
be run in polynomial time, we invoke Lemma 3.10 to perform learning on the empirical product
distribution.
Given our view of the algorithms as mappings from value vectors to the payoff, the expected
payoff of an algorithm is then the expectation of its output on the value distributions. Given
Theorem 4.2, it suffices to learn the expected payoff of all index-based algorithms. The problem
then boils down to bounding the pseudo-dimension of the class of index-based mappings. Modulo
a technical issue which calls for truncating the index-based algorithms, that is an outline of the
proof of the following sample complexity theorem.
Theorem 4.3. Given search costs c1, . . . , cn, for any ǫ > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1), there is
M = O
(
H2
ǫ2
log2(
H
ǫ
)
[
n log n log(
H
ǫ
) + log(
1
δ
)
])
,
such that given m ≥M samples, a search procedure computed on these samples has expected payoff
within additive ǫ to the optimal algorithm with probability at least 1 − δ. Moreover, the procedure
can be computed in polynomial time.
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Compared with Guo et al. (2019a)’s bound O( n
ǫ2
log2(1ǫ ) log(
n
ǫ ) log(
n
ǫδ )) (where H is normalized
to 1), our bound is better: theirs has a n
ǫ2
log2(1ǫ )(log
2 n+ log 1ǫ log
1
ǫδ ) term while we do not.
We devote the rest of this subsection to the proof of Theorem 4.3. Let HP be the class of all
index-based mappings. The technical centerpiece is a bound on the pseudo-dimension of HP .
Lemma 4.4. Pdim(HP ) = O(n log n).
Proof. Given any profile of values (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ [0,H]
n, the output of any index-based mapping
with indices (ri)i is fully determined by the following O(n
2) linear inequalities: for any i, j ∈ [n],
whether ri ≥ rj or ri < rj; for any i, j ∈ [n], whether ri ≥ vj or ri < vj . That is, the space of
indices is partitioned by the hyperplanes given by these O(n2) inequalities, and within each region
the corresponding index-based mapping remains a constant for this profile of values. Consider any
m value profiles that are pseudo-shattered by HP . Each of these m value profiles imposes O(n
2)
linear inequalities on the space of indices, and we will have altogether O(mn2) inequalities. A crucial
observation is that, for any positive integer t, the space Rn can be partitioned by t hyperplanes
into at most O(tn) regions. Therefore the space of indices, which is Rn, can be divided into at
most (Cmn2)n regions, for some constant C > 0. Any index-based algorithm within such a region
gives the same outputs on all these m value profiles, and therefore cannot give different signs for
any profile no matter what the corresponding witness is. To shatter m profiles we need at least 2m
regions. Therefore 2m ≤ (Cmn2)n, which gives m ≤ C ′n log n for some C ′ > 0.
Note that, if the values are between 0 andH, without loss of generality we may assume ci ≤ H for
each i. (Otherwise the box should be discarded by any reasonable algorithm.) With this, directly
combining Lemma 4.4 and Theorem 3.6 would still yield a bound having a cubic dependence
on n, because the output of an index-based mapping may span the range [−nH,H]. A similar
problem also arose in the approach of Guo et al. (2019a), who remedied this by observing that
the performance of the optimal index-based algorithm is not affected much if it is truncated: to
truncate an algorithm for the Pandora’s Box problem, the algorithm is terminated immediately
when its cumulated cost exceeds Ω(H log Hǫ ).
Lemma 4.5 (Lemma 25 of Guo et al., 2019a). On an instance of the Pandora’s Box problem, the
expected payoff of the optimal index-based algorithm exceeds that of its truncated version by no more
than ǫ.
The proof of Lemma 4.4 is easily modified to give the same bound on the pseudo-dimension
of mappings corresponding to truncated index-based algorithms. With this, we can now combine
Theorem 3.6 and Lemma 3.10 to obtain a sample complexity upper bound.
We remark that in Theorem 4.3 we show the sample complexity for uniform convergence on
product distribution, because this yields a fast algorithm given samples: simply running the optimal
truncated index-based algorithm on the empirical product distribution is guaranteed to be approx-
imately optimal on F with high probability. On the other hand, picking out the best index-based
algorithm on the empirical distribution, which is a correlated distribution, appears computationally
challenging.
4.2 Descending Auction with Search Costs
In this section, we briefly review the main results by Kleinberg et al. (2016) in Section 4.2.1, and
then in Section 4.2.2 present our learning results in auctions with search costs. Recall that in
this setting, we consider a single-item auction, where each bidder i has a value vi ∈ [0,H] drawn
independently from distribution Fi, but vi is not known to anyone at the beginning of the auction.
In order to observe the value, bidder i needs to pay a known search cost ci ∈ [0,H].
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4.2.1 Transformation with Distributional Knowledge
Descending auction with search costs. In a descending auction (or Dutch auction), a publicly
visible price descends continuously from H. At any point, any bidder may claim the item at the
current price. With search cost, a bidder’s strategy αi consists of two parts:
2 a threshold price ti
and a mapping bi(·) from values to bids. Concretely, bidder i decides to inspect when the price
descends to ti, at which point she pays the search cost and immediately learns her value vi. After
seeing her value, the bidder chooses another a purchase price bi(vi) ≤ ti at which to claim the item.
The latter is equivalent to submitting a bid bi(vi) ≤ ti.
We say a strategy αi = (ti, bi(·)) is monotone if bi(·) is monotone non-decreasing. A strategy is
mixed if it is a distribution over pure strategies αi’s. Mixed strategies allow bidders to randomize
over the threshold price ti and the purchase price bi(vi). Abusing notations, we also use αi to denote
a mixed strategy. We say a mixed strategy αi is monotone if it is a distribution over monotone
pure strategies.
We use DA(F , c) to denote a descending auction on value distributions F with search costs
c, and let u
DA(F ,c)
i (αi,α−i) be the expected utility of bidder i when bidders use strategies α =
(αi,α−i) and their values are drawn from F . Note that this utility is ex ante, since the value is
unknown until the bidder searches. The solution concept we consider is therefore a Nash equilibrium
instead of a Bayes Nash equilibrium.
Definition 4.6. In DA(F , c), a (mixed) strategy profile α is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium (ǫ-NE) if for
each bidder i and any strategy α′i,
u
DA(F ,c)
i (αi,α−i) ≥ u
DA(F ,c)
i (α
′
i,α−i)− ǫ.
If ǫ = 0, α is a Nash equilibrium.
We use FPA(F ) to denote the first price auction with value distributions F . Denote by
u
FPA(F )
i (β) the (ex ante) expected utility of bidder i in FPA(F ), when the bidders use strategy
profile β. We can similarly define the Nash equilibrium for a first price auction.
Definition 4.7. In FPA(F ), a (mixed) strategy profile β is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium (ǫ-NE) if for
each bidder i and any strategy β′i,
u
FPA(F )
i (βi,β−i) ≥ u
FPA(F )
i (β
′
i,β−i)− ǫ.
If ǫ = 0, β is a Nash equilibrium.
Note that Nash equilibrium is an ex ante notion, in contrast to BNE (Definition 2.1), which is
an interim notion and requires every type to best respond. In a first price auction, an ǫ-BNE must
be an ǫ-NE, but the reverse is not true.
With no search cost, the Dutch auction is well known to be equivalent to a first price auction.
Given a Dutch auction with search costs, Kleinberg et al. (2016) constructed a first price auction
with transformed value distributions and no search costs, and showed that an NE of this FPA
corresponds to an NE of the Dutch auction with search costs.
Definition 4.8. Given a distribution Fi and a search cost ci, define the index ri of (Fi, ci) to be
the unique solution to Evi∼Fi [max{vi − ri, 0}] = ci. If ci = 0, let ri = H. We always assume
Evi∼Fi [vi] ≥ ci, so that ri ∈ [0,H]. (Otherwise the search cost would be so high that the bidder
should never search for the value.)
2Note that there is no private information at the beginning of the auction.
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For a distribution F and some r ∈ R, we define F r to be the distribution of min{v, r} where
v ∼ F . For a product distribution F and a vector r, we use F r to denote the product distribution
whose i-th component is F rii . A key insight of Kleinberg et al. (2016) is a pair of utility-preserving
mappings between strategies in DA(F , c) and FPA(F r), where r is the vector of indices for (F , c).
Definition 4.9. For each bidder i, given distribution Fi and ri ∈ [0,H], define two mappings:
3
1. λri : a monotone strategy βi : [0, ri] → R+ in FPA(F
r) is mapped by λri to the strategy in
DA(F , c) with threshold price ti = βi(ri) and bidding function bi(vi) = βi(min{vi, ri}). (By
the monotonicity of βi, we have bi(vi) ≤ ti).
2. µ(Fi,ri): a strategy αi = (ti, bi(·)) in DA(F , c) is mapped by µ
(Fi,ri) to a strategy βi =
µ(Fi,ri)(αi) in FPA(F
r), with βi(vi) = bi(vi) for vi < ri and βi(ri) = bi(v
′
i), where v
′
i is
a random variable drawn from Fi conditioning on v
′
i ≥ ri.
The superscripts ri and (Fi, ri) should make it clear that the mapping λ
ri is determined solely by ri
while µ(Fi,ri) is related to both the distribution and ri.
A strategy αi = (ti, bi(·)) in a descending auction is said to claim above ri if bi(vi) = ti for all
vi ≥ ri, i.e., the bidder claims the item immediately if she finds the value of the item greater than
or equal to ri.
Claim 4.10 (Claim 2 of Kleinberg et al., 2016). Given distribution Fi whose index is ri,
1. If αi claims above ri, then αi = λ
ri(µ(Fi,ri)(αi)).
2. If βi is monotone, then βi = µ
(Fi,ri)(λri(βi)).
Theorem 4.11 (Claim 3 of Kleinberg et al., 2016). Suppose r is the vector of indices of (F , c)
(Definition 4.8).
1. For any monotone mixed strategy profile β = (βi,β−i) for FPA(F
r), for each bidder i,
u
FPA(F r)
i (β) = u
DA(F ,c)
i (λ
r(β)).
2. For any mixed (not necessarily monotone) strategy profile α = (αi,α−i) for DA(F , c), for
each bidder i,
u
DA(F ,c)
i (α) ≤ u
FPA(F r)
i (µ
(F ,r)(α)),
where “=” obtains if αi claims above ri.
Theorem 4.12 (Kleinberg et al., 2016). Given DA(F , c) and FPA(F r) where r is the indices of
(F , c). If β is a BNE in FPA(F r), then λr(β) is an NE in DA(F , c). Conversely, if α is an NE
in DA(F , c), then µ(F ,r)(α) is an NE in FPA(F r).
Finally, we review a welfare guarantee shown by Kleinberg et al.. Combining Theorem 4.12
with known bound on the Price of Anarchy for the first price auction (Syrgkanis and Tardos, 2013),
Kleinberg et al. concluded that the welfare of an NE in a Dutch auction with search costs is at
least a (1− 1/e)-fraction of the maximum expected welfare.
3We describe mappings for pure strategies here. For mixed strategies, their images are naturally distributions over
the images of pure strategies under λ and µ.
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For our purpose, we generalize their conclusion to ǫ-NE. Formally, let Ai(α) be an indicator
variable for whether bidder i receives the item, and let Ii(α) be an indicator variable for whether
bidder i inspects her value. The social welfare of a strategy profile α is
SWDA(F ,c)(α) = E
[
n∑
i=1
(Ai(α)vi − Ii(α)ci)
]
, (6)
where the randomness is over v ∼ F and the randomness of mixed strategies. Let OPT(F ,c) be the
maximum expected welfare, obtained by Pandora’s Box algorithm (Theorem 4.2) on distributions
F1, . . . , Fn and costs c1, . . . , cn.
Lemma 4.13 (Corollary 1 and Theorem 1 of Kleinberg et al., 2016). Let ri be the index of (Fi, ci)
and κi = min{vi, ri}, then OPT
(F ,c) = E[maxi∈[n] κi].
Theorem 4.14 (A slight generalization of Kleinberg et al., 2016). Suppose α is an ǫ-NE in
DA(F , c), then SWDA(F ,c)(α) ≥ (1− 1e )OPT
(F ,c)−nǫ.
The proof of Theorem 4.14 follows the smoothness framework (Syrgkanis and Tardos, 2013) and is
given in Appendix C.1.
4.2.2 Transformation with Samples
We are now ready to present our learning results on auctions with search costs. In Kleinberg et al.
(2016), the utility- and equilibrium-preserving mappings λr and µ(F ,r) depend on the value distri-
butions. We examine the number of samples needed to compute approximations of these mappings,
when the value distributions are unknown. We find that, given search costs and value samples,
O˜(1/ǫ2) samples suffice to construct mappings between strategies that approximately preserve util-
ity; with O˜(n/ǫ2) samples, any equilibrium of the first price auction without search costs on a
transformed empirical distribution can be mapped to an approximate equilibrium of the descend-
ing auction on the true distribution. By Theorem 4.14, such an approximate equilibrium in the
descending auction must obtain a (1− 1/e)-approximation to the optimal welfare. To make use of
this result, a market designer could collect O˜(n/ǫ2) value samples to compute an approximate Nash
in the said FPA, which then maps to an approximate Nash in the Dutch auction. This approximate
Nash can serve as bidding guidance for the participants, and guarantees approximate efficiency of
the market.
When value distribution Fi’s are unknown (but cost ci’s are known), the mapping λ
r is also
unknown, because each index ri is determined by the distribution Fi. Instead, we estimate an
index rˆi from samples and use the corresponding mapping λ
rˆ.
Definition 4.15. Partition the samples s into two sets, sA and sB, each of size m/2. Denote the
empirical product distributions on sA and sB as EA and E, respectively. The empirical indices
are the indices rˆ for (EA, c); namely, rˆi is the unique solution to Evi∼EAi
[max{vi − rˆi, 0}] = ci.
The empirical counterpart of DA(F , c) is FPA(Erˆ). The empirical mappings are λrˆ and µ(F ,rˆ),
computed as in Definition 4.9.
Note that µ(F ,rˆ) depends on distributions while λrˆ does not. The following theorem, analogous
to Theorem 4.11, shows that the empirical mappings λrˆ and µ(F ,rˆ) approximately preserve the
utilities with high probability.
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Theorem 4.16. For any ǫ, δ > 0, there is M = O
(
H2
ǫ2
[
log
(
H
ǫ
)
+ log
(
n
δ
)])
, such that for all
m > M , with probability at least 1− δ over the random draw of sA,
1. For any monotone mixed strategy profile β in FPA(F rˆ), for each bidder i,∣∣∣uFPA(F rˆ)i (β)− uDA(F ,c)i (λrˆ(β))∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ.
2. For any mixed strategy profile α in DA(F , c), for each bidder i,
u
DA(F ,c)
i (α) ≤ u
FPA(F rˆ)
i (µ
(F ,rˆ)(α)) + ǫ.
If αi claims above rˆi, then we also have u
DA(F ,c)
i (α) ≥ u
FPA(F rˆ)
i (µ
(F ,rˆ)(α))− ǫ.
Before proving Theorem 4.16, we first derive a few important consequences.
Corollary 4.17. For any ǫ, δ > 0, and m > M as in the condition of Theorem 4.16, with probability
at least 1− δ,
1. For any monotone strategy profile β, if β is an ǫ′-NE in FPA(F rˆ), then λrˆ(β) is an (ǫ′+2ǫ)-
NE in DA(F , c).
2. Conversely, for any strategy profile α that claims above rˆ, if α is an ǫ′-NE in DA(F , c), then
µ(F ,rˆ)(α) is an (ǫ′ + 2ǫ)-NE in FPA(F rˆ).
Proof. We prove the two items respectively,
1. Let β = (βi,β−i) be an ǫ
′-NE in FPA(F rˆ) satisfying the condition in the statement. For any
strategy αi, by Theorem 4.16 item 2,
u
DA(F ,c)
i (αi, λ
rˆ(β−i)) ≤ u
FPA(F rˆ)
i (µ
(F ,rˆ)(αi), µ
(F ,rˆ)(λrˆ(β−i))) + ǫ.
Since β−i is monotone, by Claim 4.10 item 2, we have µ
(F ,rˆ)(λrˆ(β−i)) = β−i. Thus,
u
DA(F ,c)
i (αi, λ
rˆ(β−i)) ≤ u
FPA(F rˆ)
i (µ
(F ,rˆ)(αi),β−i) + ǫ
β is an ǫ′-NE in FPA(F rˆ)
≤ u
FPA(F rˆ)
i (β) + ǫ
′ + ǫ
Theorem 4.16 item 1
≤ u
DA(F ,c)
i (λ
rˆ(β)) + ǫ′ + 2ǫ.
2. For any strategy βi, by Proposition 2.2, there exists some monotone strategy β
′
i, such that
u
FPA(F rˆ)
i (βi, µ
(F ,rˆ)(α−i)) ≤ u
FPA(F rˆ)
i (β
′
i, µ
(F ,rˆ)(α−i)).
Then by Theorem 4.16 item 1,
u
FPA(F rˆ)
i (β
′
i, µ
(F ,rˆ)(α−i)) ≤ u
DA(F ,c)
i (λ
rˆ(β′i), λ
rˆ(µ(F ,rˆ)(α−i))) + ǫ.
Since α−i claims above rˆ−i, by Claim 4.10 item 1, we have λ
rˆ(µ(F ,rˆ)(α−i)) = α−i. Thus
u
FPA(F rˆ)
i (βi, µ
(F ,rˆ)(α−i)) ≤ u
DA(F ,c)
i (λ
rˆ(β′i),α−i) + ǫ
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α is an ǫ′-NE in DA(F , c)
≤ u
DA(F ,c)
i (α) + ǫ
′ + ǫ
Theorem 4.16 item 2
≤ u
FPA(F rˆ)
i (µ
(F ,rˆ)(α)) + ǫ′ + 2ǫ.
As a consequence of Corollary 4.17, Corollary 3.13 and Theorem 4.14, any approximate BNE
in FPA(Erˆ) is transformed by λrˆ to a nearly efficient approximate NE in DA(F , c), as formalized
by the following theorem.
Theorem 4.18. For any ǫ, ǫ′, δ > 0, there is M = O
(
H2
ǫ2
[
n log n log
(
H
ǫ
)
+ log
(
n
δ
)])
, such that
for all m > M , with probability at least 1 − δ over random draws of samples s, we have: for any
monotone strategy profile β that is an ǫ′-BNE in FPA(Erˆ), λrˆ(β) is an (ǫ′ + 4ǫ)-NE in DA(F , c);
moreover, SWDA(F ,c)(λrˆ(β)) ≥ (1− 1e )OPT
(F ,c)−n(ǫ′ + 4ǫ)
Proof. First use Corollary 3.13 on distributions F rˆ. Note that Erˆ is an empirical product distri-
bution for F rˆ; this is because E consists of samples sB , whereas rˆ is determined by samples in sA,
and sA and sB are disjoint. Thus, with probability at least 1 − δ/2 over the random draw of sB,
any monotone strategy profile β that is an ǫ′-BNE in FPA(Erˆ) is an (ǫ′+2ǫ)-BNE in FPA(F rˆ). An
(ǫ′ + 2ǫ)-BNE must be an (ǫ′ + 2ǫ)-NE in FPA(F rˆ), so by Corollary 4.17, with probability at least
1− δ/2 over the random draw of sA, λrˆ(β) is an (ǫ′ + 4ǫ)-NE in DA(F , c). The welfare guarantee
follows from Theorem 4.14.
Theorem 4.18 does not include the reverse direction, i.e., from an ǫ′-NE in DA(F , c) to an
(ǫ′ + 4ǫ)-BNE in FPA(Erˆ) (cf. Theorem 4.12). This is for two reasons: (1) Such a transformation
will result in (ǫ′+4ǫ)-NE in FPA(Erˆ), but (ǫ′ +4ǫ)-NE in FPA(Erˆ) is not necessarily an (ǫ′ +4ǫ)-
BNE. (2) Unlike interim utility, ex ante utility cannot be learned from samples directly; in other
words, u
FPA(Erˆ)
i (β) does not necessarily approximate u
FPA(F rˆ)
i (β) even if β is monotone. This is
because in the computation of ex ante utility we need to take expectation over bidder i’s own value
but for interim utility we do not need to take such an expectation.
Proof of Theorem 4.16. The main idea is as follows: For item 1, we need to show that the
utility of a strategy profile β in FPA(F rˆ) approximates the utility of its image α = λrˆ(β) in
DA(F , c). We wish to use Theorem 4.11 to do so but it cannot be used directly because rˆ is not
the indices of (F , c). Instead, we construct a set of “empirical costs” cˆ such that rˆ becomes the
indices of (F , cˆ). Then Theorem 4.11 can be used to show that u
FPA(F rˆ)
i (β) = u
DA(F ,cˆ)
i (α). With
an additional lemma (Lemma 4.19) which shows that cˆ approximates c up to ǫ-error, we are able
to establish the following chain of approximate equations
u
FPA(F rˆ)
i (β) = u
DA(F ,cˆ)
i (α)
ǫ
≈ u
DA(F ,c)
i (α).
The proof for item 2 is similar.
Formally, define cˆ = (cˆi)i∈[n], where
cˆi := Evi∼Fi [max{vi − rˆi, 0}] . (7)
Note that cˆi is determined by samples s
A since the empirical index rˆi is computed from s
A.
17
Lemma 4.19. There is M = O
(
H2
ǫ2
[
log Hǫ + log
n
δ
])
, such that if m/2 > M , then with probability
at least 1− δ over the random draw of sA, for each i ∈ [n], |ci − cˆi| ≤ ǫ.
Proof. The main idea of the proof is to show that the class Hi = {h
r | r ∈ [−H,H]} where
hr(x) = max{x− r, 0} has pseudo-dimension Pdim(Hi) = O(1) and thus uniformly converges with
O
(
H2
ǫ2
[
log Hǫ + log
1
δ
])
samples.
Formally, consider the pseudo-dimension d of the class Hi = {h
r | r ∈ [−H,H]} where
hr(x) := max{x − r, 0} for x ∈ [0,H] (thus hr(x) ∈ [0, 2H]). We claim that d = O(1). To see
this, fix any d samples (x1, x2, . . . , xd) and any witnesses (t1, t2, . . . , td), we bound the number of
distinct labelings that can be given by Hi to these samples. Each sample xj induces a partition of
the parameter space (the space of r) [−H,H] into two intervals [−H,xj ] and (xj ,H], such that for
any r ≤ xj , h
r(xj) = xj − r, and for r > xj, h
r(xj) = 0. All d samples partition [−H,H] into (at
most) d + 1 consecutive intervals, I1, . . . , Id+1, such that within each interval Ik, h
r(xj) is either
xj − r for all r ∈ Ik or 0 for all r ∈ Ik, for each j ∈ [d]. We further divide each Ik using witnesses
tj’s: for each j ∈ [d], if h
r(xj) = xj − r for r ∈ Ik, then we cut Ik at the point r = xj − tj; in this
way we cut each Ik into at most d+ 1 sub-intervals. Within each sub-interval I
′ ⊆ Ik, the labeling
of the d samples given by all hr (r ∈ I ′) is the same. Since there are at most (d+1)2 sub-intervals
in total, there are at most (d+ 1)2 distinct labelings. To pseudo-shatter d samples, we must have
2d ≤ (d+ 1)2, which gives d = O(1).
By the definition of rˆi, we have
ci = Evi∼EAi
[max{vi − rˆi, 0}] = Evi∼EAi
[
hrˆi(vi)
]
,
and rˆi ∈ [−H,H]. Also note that cˆi = Evi∼Fi [h
rˆi(vi)]. Thus the conclusion |ci − cˆi| ≤ ǫ follows
from Theorem 3.6 and a union bound over i ∈ [n].
Lemma 4.20. Suppose |ci − cˆi| ≤ ǫ, then for any strategies α,∣∣∣uDA(F ,c)i (α)− uDA(F ,cˆ)i (α)∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ.
Proof. Couple the realizations of values (and threshold prices and bids if the strategies are ran-
domized) in DA(F , c) and DA(F , cˆ). When bidders use the same strategies α in the two auctions
DA(F , c) and DA(F , cˆ), bidder i receives the same allocation and pays the same price. The only
difference between bidder i’s utilities in these two auctions is the difference between the search costs
she pays, which is upper-bounded by |ci − cˆi| ≤ ǫ.
Now we finish the proof of Theorem 4.16.
Proof of Theorem 4.16. First consider item 1. We use a
ǫ
≈ b to denote |a − b| ≤ ǫ. Given any
monotone strategies β for FPA(Erˆ),
u
FPA(F rˆ)
i (β) = u
DA(F ,cˆ)
i (λ
rˆ(β)) Theorem 4.11 item 1
ǫ
≈ u
DA(F ,c)
i (λ
rˆ(β)) Lemma 4.20.
Then for item 2, given any strategies α for DA(F , c), by Lemma 4.20,
u
DA(F ,c)
i (α)
ǫ
≈ u
DA(F ,cˆ)
i (α)
By Theorem 4.11 item 2, we have u
DA(F ,cˆ)
i (α) ≤ u
FPA(F rˆ)
i (µ
(F ,rˆ)(α)) where “=” holds if αi claims
above rˆi, which concludes the proof.
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5 Conclusion
In this work we obtained almost tight sample complexity bounds for learning utilities in first price
auctions and all pay auctions. Whereas utilities for unconstrained bidding strategies are hard to
learn, we show that learning is made possible by focusing on monotone bidding strategies, which
is sufficient for all practical purposes. We also extended the results to auctions where search costs
are present.
Whereas monotonicity is a natural assumption on bidding strategies in a single item auction, it
does not immediately generalize to multi-parameter settings. It is an interesting question whether
our results can be generalized to multi-item auctions, such as simultaneous first-price auctions, via
more general, lossless structural assumptions on the bidding strategies.
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A Missing Proofs from Section 2
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Proposition 2.2. In a first price auction or an all pay auction, for any bidding strategy bi(·) of
bidder i, for any value distributions F−i, and any bidding strategies b−i(·), there is a monotone
bidding strategy b′i(·) such that ∀vi ∈ Ti, ui(vi, b
′
i(vi), b−i(·)) ≥ ui(vi, bi(vi), b−i(·)).
Proof. For all practical purposes we may assume bi(Ti) to be compact. Fix the distributions F−i and
strategies b−i(·) of other bidders. To simplify notation when b−i(·) is fixed, let the interim allocation
xi(bi) be Ev−i∼F−i [xi(bi, b−i(v−i))], the interim payment pi(bi) := Ev−i∼F−i [pi(bi, b−i(v−i))], and
the interim utility ui(vi, bi) := ui(vi, bi, b−i(·)). Without loss of generality, we may assume for each
vi, ui(vi, bi(vi)) = maxv∈Ti ui(vi, bi(v)) (Otherwise we can first readjust bi(·) this way, which only
weakly improves the utility of all types.)
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Suppose bi(·) is non-monotone, i.e., there exist v
′
i > vi, such that bi(v
′
i) < bi(vi). By the
assumption that ui(vi, bi(vi)) = maxv∈Ti ui(vi, bi(v)) for each vi, we have
vixi(bi(vi))− pi(bi(vi)) ≥ vixi(bi(v
′
i))− pi(bi(v
′
i)); (8)
v′ixi(bi(v
′
i))− pi(bi(v
′
i)) ≥ v
′
ixi(bi(vi))− pi(bi(vi)). (9)
Adding (8) and (9), we obtain
(v′i − vi)[xi(bi(v
′
i))− xi(bi(vi))] ≥ 0. (10)
Since v′i > vi, we get
xi(bi(v
′
i)) ≥ xi(bi(vi)). (11)
In both the first price auction and the all pay auction we also have xi(bi(v
′
i)) ≤ xi(bi(vi)) because
the probability that i receives the item cannot decrease if her bid increases. Therefore, it must be
xi(bi(v
′
i)) = xi(bi(vi)). (12)
Plugging (12) into (8) and (9), we obtain
pi(bi(v
′
i)) = pi(bi(vi)). (13)
For the all pay auction, since bidder i pays her bid whether or not she wins the item, (13)
implies bi(vi) = bi(v
′
i), a contradiction.
For the first price auction, for any bid b made by bidder i, pi(b) = b · xi(b). By (13),
bi(v
′
i)xi(bi(v
′
i)) = bi(vi)xi(bi(vi)). On the other hand, xi(bi(v
′
i)) = xi(bi(vi)) and bi(v
′
i) > bi(vi),
so we must have
xi(bi(v
′
i)) = xi(bi(vi)) = 0.
In other words, bi(vi) must be monotone non-decreasing everywhere except maybe for values whose
bids are so low that the bidder does not win and hence obtains zero utility. Letting the bidder
bid 0 for all values on which her allocation is 0 does not affect her utility and yields a monotone
bidding strategy.
B Missing Proofs from Section 3
B.1 Upper Bound
B.1.1 Proof of Lemma 3.7
Lemma 3.7. If tie breaking is random-allocation or no-allocation, then Pdim(Hi) = O(n log n).
Proof. We discussed the case with n = 2 in Section 3.1. Now we consider the general case with
n > 2 bidders. We give the proof for the random-allocation tie-breaking rule; the proof for the
no-allocation rule is similar (and in fact simpler). For ease of notation, we use xk to denote sk−i.
Recall that each xk is a vector in Rn−1. We write its j-th component as xkj . We start with a simple
observation: for any vi and b(·), the output of h
vi,b(·) on any input xk must be one of the following
n+ 1 values: vi − bi,
vi−bi
2 , . . . ,
vi−bi
n , or 0; this value is fully determined by the n− 1 comparisons
bi S bj(xkj ) for each j 6= i. We argue that the hypothesis class Hi can be divided into O(m2n)
sub-classes {Hki }k∈[m+1]2(n−1) such that each sub-class H
k
i generates at most O(m
n) different label
22
vectors. Thus Hi generates at most O(m
3n) label vectors in total. To pseudo-shatter m samples,
we need O(m3n) ≥ 2m, which implies m = O(n log n).
We now define sub-classes {Hki }k, each indexed by k ∈ [m+1]
2(n−1). For each dimension j 6= i,
we sort the m samples by their j-th coordinates non-decreasingly, and use π(j, ·) to denote the
resulting permutation over {1, 2, . . . ,m}; formally, let x
π(j,1)
j ≤ x
π(j,2)
j ≤ · · · ≤ x
π(j,m)
j . For each
hypothesis hvi,b(·)(·), for each j, we define two special positions; these positions are similar to the
position k in the case for two bidders; we now need a pair, because of the need to keep track of ties,
due to the more complex random-allocation tie-breaking rule. Let kj,1 be max{0, {k : bj(x
π(j,k)
j ) <
bi(vi)}}, and let kj,2 be min{m+1, {k : bj(x
π(j,k)
j ) > bi(vi)}}. As in the case for two bidders, this is
well defined because of the monotonicity of bj(·). It also follows that, if kj,1 < kj,2− 1, then for any
k such that kj,1 < k < kj,2, we must have bj(x
π(j,k)
j ) = bi(vi). A hypothesis h
vi,b(·)(·) belongs to
sub-class Hki where the index k is (kj,1, kj,2)j∈[n]\{i}. The number of sub-classes is clearly bounded
by (m+ 1)2(n−1).
We now show that the hypotheses within each sub-class Hki give rise to at most (m + 1)
n
label vectors. Let us focus on one such class with index k. On the k-th sample xk, a hypothesis’s
membership in Hki suffices to specify whether bidder i is a winner on this sample, and, if so,
the number of other winning bids at a tie. Therefore, the class index k determines a mapping
c : [m] → {0, 1, . . . , n}, with c(k) > 0 meaning bidder i is a winner on sample xk at a tie with
c(k) − 1 other bidders, and c(k) = 0 meaning bidder i is a loser on sample xk. The output of a
hypothesis hvi,b(·)(·) ∈ Hki on sample x
k is then (vi − bi(vi))/c(k) if c(k) > 0 and 0 otherwise. The
same utility is output on two samples xk and xk
′
whenever c(k) = c(k′). Therefore, if we look at
the labels assigned to a set S of samples that are mapped to the nonzero integer by c, there can be
at most |S|+1 ≤ m+1 patterns of labels, because we compare the same utility with |S| witnesses;
the set of samples mapped to 0 by c have only one pattern of labels. The vector of labels generated
by a hypothesis in such a sub-class is a concatenation of these patterns. The image of c has n
nonzero integers, and so there are at most (m+ 1)n label vectors.
To conclude, the total number of label vectors generated by Hi =
⋃
k
Hki is at most
(m+ 1)2(n−1)(m+ 1)n ≤ (m+ 1)3n.
To pseudo-shatter m samples, we need (m+ 1)3n ≥ 2m, which implies m = O(n log n).
B.1.2 Proof of Lemma 3.10
Lemma 3.10. Let H be a class of functions from a product space T to [0,H]. If H is (ǫ, δ)-
uniformly convergent with sample complexity m = m(ǫ, δ), then H is
(
2ǫ, Hδǫ
)
-uniformly convergent
on product distribution with sample complexity m.
Proof. Think of the samples s as an m×nmatrix (sji ), where each row j ∈ [m] represents sample s
j,
and each column i ∈ [n] consists of the values sampled from Fi. Then we draw n permutations
π1, ..., πn of [m] = {1, . . . ,m} independently and uniformly at random, and permute the m elements
in column i by πi. Regard each new row j as a new sample, denoted by s˜
j = (s
π1(j)
1 , s
π2(j)
2 , ..., s
πn(j)
n ).
Given π1, . . . , πn, the “permuted samples” s˜
j, j = 1, . . . ,m then have the same distributions as m
i.i.d. random draws from F .
For h ∈ H, let ph be Ev∼F [h(v)]. Then by the definition of (ǫ, δ)-uniform convergence (but not
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on product distribution),
Prs,π

∃h ∈ H,
∣∣∣∣∣∣ph −
1
m
m∑
j=1
h(s˜j)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ ǫ

 ≤ δ. (14)
For a set of fixed samples s = (s1, . . . , sm), recall that Ei is the uniform distribution over
{s1i , . . . , s
m
i }, and E =
∏n
i=1Ei. We show that the expected value of h on E satisfies Ev∼E [h(v)] =
Eπ[
1
m
∑m
j=1 h(s˜
j)]. This is because
Eπ
[
1
m
m∑
i=1
h(s˜j)
]
=
1
m
m∑
j=1
Eπ
[
h(s˜j)
]
=
1
m
m∑
j=1
∑
(k1,...,kn)∈[m]n
h(sk11 , . . . , s
kn
n ) ·
Prπ [π1(j) = k1, . . . , πn(j) = kn]
=
1
m
m∑
j=1
∑
(k1,...,kn)∈[m]n
h(sk11 , . . . , s
kn
n ) ·
1
mn
=
1
mn
∑
(k1,...,kn)∈[m]n
h(sk11 , . . . , s
kn
n )
= Ev∼E [h(v)] .
Thus,
|ph −Ev∼E [h(v)]| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ph −Eπ

 1
m
m∑
j=1
h(s˜j)


∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ Eπ


∣∣∣∣∣∣ph −
1
m
m∑
j=1
h(s˜j)
∣∣∣∣∣∣


≤ Prπ


∣∣∣∣∣∣ph −
1
m
m∑
j=1
h(s˜j)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ ǫ

 ·H
+

1−Prπ


∣∣∣∣∣∣ph −
1
m
m∑
j=1
h(s˜j)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ ǫ



 · ǫ
≤ Prπ [Bad(h, π, s)] ·H + ǫ,
where in the last step we define event
Bad(h, π, s) = I


∣∣∣∣∣∣ph −
1
m
m∑
j=1
h(s˜j)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ ǫ

 .
By simple calculation, whenever |ph −Ev∼E [h(v)]| ≥ 2ǫ, we have Prπ[Bad(h, π, s)] ≥ ǫ/H.
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Finally, consider the random draw s ∼ F ,
Prs [∃h ∈ H, |ph −Ev∼E [h(v)]| ≥ 2ǫ] ≤ Prs
[
∃h ∈ H, Prπ [Bad(h, π, s)] ≥
ǫ
H
]
≤ Prs
[
Prπ [∃h ∈ H, Bad(h, π, s) holds] ≥
ǫ
H
]
.
By Markov’s inequality, this is in turn upper bounded by
H
ǫ
Es [Prπ [∃h ∈ H, Bad(h, π, s) holds]] =
H
ǫ
Prs,π [∃h ∈ H, Bad(h, π, s) holds]
≤
Hδ
ǫ
By (14)
B.2 Lower Bound: Proof of Theorem 3.15
Theorem 3.15. For any ǫ < 14000 , δ <
1
20 , there is a family of product distributions for which no
algorithm (ǫ, δ)-learns, with m samples, utilities over the set of all monotone bidding strategies, for
any m ≤ 1
4×108
· n
ǫ2
.
Fixing ǫ > 0, fixing c1 = 2000, we first define two value distributions. Let F
+ be a distribution
supported on {0, 1}, and for v ∼ F+, Pr[v = 0] = 1 − 1+c1ǫn , and Pr[v = 1] =
1+c1ǫ
n . Similarly
define F−: for v ∼ F−, Pr[v = 0] = 1− 1−c1ǫn , and Pr[v = 1] =
1−c1ǫ
n .
Let KL(F+;F−) denote the KL-divergence between the two distributions.
Claim B.1. KL(F+;F−) = O( ǫ
2
n ).
Proof. By definition,
KL(F+;F−) =
1 + c1ǫ
n
ln
(
1 + c1ǫ
1− c1ǫ
)
+
n− 1− c1ǫ
n
ln
(
n− 1− c1ǫ
n− 1 + c1ǫ
)
=
1
n
ln
(
1 + c1ǫ
1− c1ǫ
·
(1− c1ǫn−1)
n−1
(1 + c1ǫn−1)
n−1
)
+
c1ǫ
n
ln
(
1 + c1ǫ
1− c1ǫ
·
1 + c1ǫn−1
1− c1ǫn−1
)
≤
1
n
ln

1 + c1ǫ
1− c1ǫ
·
(
1− c1ǫn−1
)n−1
1 + c1ǫ

+ 2c1ǫ
n
ln
(
1 +
2c1ǫ
1− c1ǫ
)
≤
1
n
ln
(
1− c1ǫ+
1
2(c1ǫ)
2
1− c1ǫ
)
+
8c21ǫ
2
n
≤
10c21ǫ
2
n
.
In the last two inequalities we used c1ǫ <
1
2 and ln(1 + x) ≤ 1 + x for all x > 0.
It is well known that upper bounds on KL-divergence implies information theoretic lower bound
on the number of samples to distinguish distributions (e.g. Mansour, 2011).
Corollary B.2. Given t i.i.d. samples from F+ or F−, if t ≤ n
80c21ǫ
2 , no algorithm H that maps
samples to {F+, F−} can do the following: when the samples are from F+, H outputs F+ with
probability at least 23 , and if the samples are from F
−, H outputs F− with probability at least 23 .
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We now construct product distributions using F+ and F−. For any S ⊆ [n− 1], define product
distribution F S to be
∏
i Fi where Fi = F
+ if i ∈ S, and Fi = F
− if i ∈ [n − 1] \ S, and Fn is
a point mass on value 1. For any j ∈ [n − 1] and S ⊆ [n − 1], distinguishing F S∪{j} and F S\{j}
by samples from the product distribution is no easier than distinguishing F+ and F−, because the
coordinates of the samples not from Fj contains no information about Fj .
Corollary B.3. For any j ∈ [n − 1] and S ⊆ [n − 1], given t i.i.d. samples from F S∪{j} or
F S\{j}, if t ≤
n
80c21ǫ
2 , no algorithm H can do the following: when the samples are from F S∪{j}, H
outputs F S∪{j} with probability at least
2
3 , and when the samples are from F S\{j}, H outputs F S\{j}
with probability at least 23 .
We now use Corollary B.3 to derive an information theoretic lower bound on learning utilities
for monotone bidding strategies, for distributions in {F S}S⊆[n].
Proof of Theorem 3.15. Without loss of generality, assume n is odd. Let S be an arbitrary subset
of [n − 1] of size either ⌊n/2⌋ or ⌈n/2⌉. We focus on the interim utility of bidder n with value 1
and bidding 12 . Denote this bidding strategy by bn(·). The other bidders may adopt one of two
bidding strategies. One of them is b+(·): b+(0) = 0 and b+(1) = 12 + η for sufficiently small η > 0.
The other bidding strategy b−(·) maps all values to 0. For T ⊆ [n − 1], let bT (·) be the profile of
bidding strategies where bi(·) = b
+(·) for i ∈ T , and bi(·) = b
−(·) for i /∈ T .
For the distribution F S,
un
(
1,
1
2
, bT (·)
)
=
1
2
Pr
[
max
i∈T
vi = 0
]
=
1
2
(
1−
1 + c1ǫ
n
)|S∩T |(
1−
1− c1ǫ
n
)|T\S|
=
1
2
(
1−
1 + c1ǫ
n
)|T |(n− 1 + c1ǫ
n− 1− c1ǫ
)|T\S|
.
Therefore, for T, T ′ ⊆ [n− 1] with |T | = |T ′|,
un(1,
1
2 , bT (·))
un(1,
1
2 , bT ′(·))
=
(
1 +
2c1ǫ/(n− 1)
1− c1ǫn−1
)|T\S|−|T ′\S|
≥ 1 +
2c1ǫ
n− 1
· (|T \ S| − |T ′ \ S|);
Suppose |T \ S| ≥ |T ′ \ S| and |T | = |T ′| ≥ ⌊n2 ⌋, then
un
(
1,
1
2
, bT (·)
)
− un
(
1,
1
2
, bT ′(·)
)
≥ (|T \ S| − |T ′ \ S|) ·
2c1ǫ
n− 1
· un
(
1,
1
2
, bT ′(·)
)
≥ (|T \ S| − |T ′ \ S|) ·
2c1ǫ
n− 1
·
1
8e2
, (15)
where the last inequality is because un(1,
1
2 , bT ′(·)) ≥
1
2(1−
2
n)
n = 12 [(1−
2
n)
n
2 ]2 ≥ 12(
1
2e )
2 = 1
8e2
.
Now suppose an algorithm A (ǫ, δ)-learns the utilities of all monotone bidding strategies with
t samples s for t ≤ n
80c21ǫ
2 . Define H : R
n×t
+ × N → 2
[n−1] be a function that outputs among all
T ⊆ [n− 1] of size k, the one that maximizes bidder n’s utility when they bid according to bidding
strategy bT . Formally,
H(s, k) = argmax
T⊆[n−1],|T |=k
A (s, n, 1, (bT (·), bn(·))) ,
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By Definition 3.1, for any S with |S| = ⌊n/2⌋, for samples drawn from F S , with probability at
least 1− δ,
A(s, n, 1, (b[n−1]\S(·), bn(·)) ≥ un
(
1,
1
2
, b[n−1]\S(·)
)
− ǫ;
and for any T ⊆ [n− 1] with |T | = ⌈n/2⌉,
A(s, n, 1, (bT (·), bn(·)) ≤ un
(
1,
1
2
, bT (·)
)
+ ǫ.
Therefore, for W = H(s, ⌈n/2⌉),
un
(
1,
1
2
, bW (·)
)
≥ un
(
1,
1
2
, b[n−1]\S(·)
)
− 2ǫ.
Since |W | = [n− 1] \ S = ⌈n/2⌉, by (15),(
⌈
n
2
⌉ − |W \ S|
)
·
c1ǫ
(n− 1)4e2
≤ 2ǫ.
So
|W ∩ S| ≤ (n− 1) ·
8e2
c1
.
In other words, with probability at least 1 − δ, H(s, ⌈n/2⌉) is the complement of S except for at
most 8e
2
c1
fraction of the coordinates in [n− 1].
Similarly, for S of cardinality ⌈n/2⌉,
|H(s, ⌈n/2⌉) ∩ S| ≤ (n− 1) ·
8e2
c1
+ 1.
Take c2 to be
8e2
c1
. We have c2 <
1
20 . For all large enough n and all S of size ⌊n/2⌋ or ⌈n/2⌉, with
probability at least 1 − δ, H(s, ⌈n/2⌉) correctly outputs the elements not in S with an exception
of at most c2 fraction of coordinates.
Let S be the set of all subsets of [n − 1] of size either ⌈n/2⌉ or ⌊n/2⌋. Consider any S ∈ S.
Let θ(S) ⊆ [n − 1] denote the set of coordinates whose memberships in S are correctly predicted
by H(s, ⌈n/2⌉) with probability at least 2/3; that is, i ∈ θ(S) iff with probability at least 2/3,
H(s, ⌈n/2⌉) is correct about whether i ∈ S. Let the cardinality of |θ(S)| be z(n − 1). Suppose we
draw coordinate i uniformly at random from [n− 1], and independently draw samples s from F S,
then the probability that H(s, ⌈n/2⌉) is correct about whether i ∈ S satisfies:
Pri,s [H(s, ⌈n/2⌉) is correct about whether i ∈ S] ≥ (1− c2)(1− δ)
≥ 0.9,
and
Pri,s [H(s, ⌈n/2⌉) is correct about whether i ∈ S] ≤ Pri [i ∈ θ(S)] · 1 +Pri [i /∈ θ(S)] ·
2
3
= z · 1 + (1− z) ·
2
3
,
which implies z > 0.6. If a pair of sets S and S′ differ in only one coordinate i, and i ∈ θ(S)∩θ(S′),
then H(·) serves as an algorithm that tells apart F S and F S′ , contradicting Corollary B.3. We now
show, with a counting argument, that such a pair of S and S′ must exist.
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Since for each S ∈ S, |θ(S)| ≥ 0.6(n− 1), there exists a coordinate i ∈ [n− 1] and T ⊆ S, with
|T | ≥ 0.6|S|, such that for each S ∈ T , i ∈ θ(S). But S can be decomposed into |S|/2 pairs of sets,
such that within each pair, the two sets differ by one in size, and precisely one of them contains
coordinate i. Therefore among these pairs there must exist one (S, S′) with S, S′ ∈ T , i.e., i ∈ θ(S)
and i ∈ θ(S′). Using H, which is induced by A, we can tell apart F S and F S′ with probability at
least 2/3, which is a contradiction to Corollary B.3. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.15.
C Missing Proofs from Section 4
C.1 Proof of Theorem 4.14
Theorem 4.14 (A slight generalization of Kleinberg et al., 2016). Suppose α is an ǫ-NE in
DA(F , c), then SWDA(F ,c)(α) ≥ (1− 1e )OPT
(F ,c)−nǫ.
Recall that Ai(α) indicates whether bidder i receives the item, and Ii(α) indicates whether
bidder i inspects her value. The expected utility of bidder i can be decomposed into a welfare term
and a payment term, as follows:
u
DA(F ,c)
i (α) = E [Ai(α)(vi − bi(vi))− Ii(α)ci] = E [Ai(α)vi − Ii(α)ci]−E [Ai(α)bi(vi)] ,
where the randomness is over v ∼ F and the randomness of mixed strategies. And the social
welfare can be expressed as the sum of utilities and payments of bidders:
SWDA(F ,c)(α) =
n∑
i=1
E [Ai(α)vi − Ii(α)ci] =
n∑
i=1
[
u
DA(F ,c)
i (α) +E [Ai(α)bi(vi)]
]
.
Now suppose α is an ǫ-NE, then
SWDA(F ,c)(α) ≥
n∑
i=1
[
u
DA(F ,c)
i (α
′
i,α−i)− ǫ+E [Ai(α)bi(vi)]
]
=
n∑
i=1
u
DA(F ,c)
i (α
′
i,α−i) +
n∑
i=1
E [Ai(α)bi(vi)]− nǫ, (16)
for any set of strategies {α′i}i∈[n].
For each i, let ri be the index of (Fi, ci). Recall that we use κi to denote min{vi, ri}. We will
construct strategies α′i that satisfy the following inequality
n∑
i=1
u
DA(F ,c)
i (α
′
i,α−i) ≥ (1−
1
e
)E
[
max
i∈[n]
κi
]
−
n∑
i=1
E [Ai(α)bi(vi)] . (17)
By (16) and (17) we have SWDA(F ,c)(α) ≥ (1 − 1e )E[maxi∈[n] κi] − nǫ. Since E[maxi∈[n] κi] =
OPT(F ,c) (Lemma 4.13), the theorem is proved.
Now we construct α′i. Each α
′
i is a mixed strategy that does the following: sample a random
variable Z ∈ [1e , 1] with probability density function fZ(z) =
1
z ; inspect the value at threshold price
t′i = (1 − Z)ri; and claim the item at price b
′
i(vi) = (1 − Z)κi. Note that α
′
i claims above ri, and
we will make use of the following property of strategies that claim above ri:
Claim C.1. For strategy α′i that claims above ri, E[Ai(α
′,α−i)vi−Ii(α
′
i,α−i)ci] = E[Ai(α
′
i,α−i)κi].
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Proof. For convenience we write Ai = Ai(α
′
i,α−i) and Ii = Ii(α
′
i,α−i). By linearity of expectation
and the definition of index,
E [Aivi − Iici] = E [Aivi]−E [Ii] ci
= E [Aivi]−E [Ii]Evi∼Fi [max{vi − ri, 0}] .
Note that vi and Ii are independent because bidder i doesn’t know her value before inspection.
Thus
E [Aivi − Iici] = E [Aivi]−E [Iimax{vi − ri, 0}]
= E [Aivi − Iimax{vi − ri, 0}]
= E [Aivi − Aimax{vi − ri, 0}+ (Ai − Ii)max{vi − ri, 0}] .
Because α′i claims above ri, we have Ai = Ii whenever vi > ri. This implies (Ai−Ii)max{vi−ri, 0} =
0 and
E [Aivi − Iici] = E [Ai(vi −max{vi − ri, 0})] = E [Aiκi] .
Now we argue that the {α′i}i∈[n] constructed above satisfy (17). By Claim C.1, we have
u
DA(F ,c)
i (α
′
i,α−i) = E[Ai(α
′
i,α−i)(κi − b
′
i(vi))]. Summing over i ∈ [n],
n∑
i=1
u
DA(F ,c)
i (α
′
i,α−i) =
n∑
i=1
E
[
Ai(α
′
i,α−i)(κi − b
′
i(vi))
]
= E
[
n∑
i=1
Ai(α
′
i,α−i)(κi − b
′
i(vi))
]
= E
[
n∑
i=1
Ai(α
′
i,α−i)Zκi
]
.
For any fixed value profile v = (vi), let i
∗ := argmaxi∈[n]{κi}. Since Ai(α
′
i,α−i)Zκi ≥ 0, we have
n∑
i=1
u
DA(F ,c)
i (α
′
i,α−i) ≥ E
[
Ai∗(α
′
i∗ ,α−i∗)Zκi∗
]
. (18)
Claim C.2. For any v, E[Ai∗(α
′
i∗ ,α−i∗)Zκi∗ | v] ≥ (1−
1
e )κi∗ −
∑n
i=1Ai(α)bi(vi).
Proof. Let p := maxj 6=i∗ bj(vj). If p ≥ (1−
1
e )κi∗ , then E[Ai∗(α
′
i∗ ,α−i∗)Zκi∗ | v] ≥ 0 ≥ (1−
1
e )κi∗−p.
Otherwise, note that whenever bidder i∗’s bid (1− Z)κi∗ is above p, she wins the item, thus
E
[
Ai∗(α
′
i∗ ,α−i∗)Zκi∗ | v
]
=
∫ 1−p/κi∗
1/e
zκi∗fZ(z)dz =
∫ 1−p/κi∗
1/e
zκi∗
1
z
dz
= (1−
1
e
−
p
κi∗
)κi∗ = (1−
1
e
)κi∗ − p.
The proof is completed by observing that
∑n
i=1 Ai(α)bi(vi) = maxi∈[n] bi(vi) ≥ p.
Taking expectation over v ∼ F , (18) and Claim C.2 immediately implies (17).
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